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BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE*
Kansas Coalition Against Sexual and Domestic Violence (KCSDV) is a nonprofit organization devoted to remedying domestic violence through legal,
legislative, and policy initiatives, as well as providing
advocacy and legal and counseling services to survivors of domestic violence. KCSDV works with survivors of domestic violence, including undertaking extensive efforts to improve the justice system’s
response to victims of domestic violence. KCSDV also
represents clients that are threatened and stalked
through the use of social media and other technology.
Legal Momentum—the Women’s Legal Defense and Education Fund, is the nation’s oldest
legal advocacy organization for women. Legal Momentum advances the rights of all women and girls,
with a particular focus on addressing gender-based violence, by using the power of the law and creating innovative public policy. For example, Legal Momentum was the leading advocate for the landmark
Violence Against Women Act and its subsequent reauthorizations, which seek to redress the historical inadequacy of the justice system’s response to domestic
*

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or
counsel for any party. No person or party other than amici, their
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for all
parties received notice of the filing of this brief pursuant to Rule
37.2 and each has consented to its filing.
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violence. Legal Momentum also represents victims of
domestic violence who suffer discrimination and inadequate justice system responses. Legal Momentum’s
National Judicial Education Program has, since 1981,
educated the judiciary on issues related to gender bias
and the adjudication of cases involving domestic and
sexual violence and, in particular, the intersection of
the two.
National Crime Victim Law Institute
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational and advocacy organization located at Lewis & Clark Law School in
Portland, Oregon. NCVLI’s mission is to actively promote balance and fairness in the justice system
through crime-victim-centered legal advocacy, education, and resource sharing. NCVLI accomplishes its
mission through education and training; technical assistance to attorneys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims’ Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of developments in crime victim law; and
provision of information on crime victim law to crime
victims and other members of the public. In addition,
NCVLI actively participates as amicus curiae in cases
involving crime victims’ rights nationwide.
National Organization for Victim Assistance
(NOVA) is the oldest victims’ rights and services organization in the world. Operating since 1975, NOVA
promotes training for victim advocates, provides direct services to victims, and seeks to educate legislative, political, law enforcement, and community leaders on issues associated with victimization so that
appropriate and effective policies can be implemented.
As one of its services, NOVA provides a nationwide
toll-free number (800-TRY-NOVA) for victims to call
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directly for referrals, resources, and information to enhance their awareness for making choices while seeking justice, remedy, and recovery. NOVA also advocates for crime victims’ rights by actively participating
as an amicus curiae in cases throughout the country.
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STATEMENT
The uncertainty and perpetual terror created by
violent threats is not just a precondition for domestic
violence—it is a pervasive manifestation of that violence. Abusers use threats to exert power over their
victims—controlling them through intimidation, fear,
and isolation. Not only are violent threats highly correlated with physical violence, but research also
shows that violent threats frequently cause trauma as
severe as physical violence.
If permitted to stand, the decision below—which
requires the state to prove that an abuser had a specific intent to cause fear—will make prosecuting and
preventing domestic violence even more challenging,
without any corresponding benefit. There is rarely direct evidence of specific intent, and domestic-violence
victims often struggle to confront their abusers in
court. Indeed, the impact of abusers’ psychological,
emotional, and physical abuse is often so severe that
victims frequently struggle even to seek help.
This Court should grant the petition and reverse
the decision below. The First Amendment does not
require proof of specific intent to punish violent
threats. The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision to impose that requirement is inconsistent with decisions
from other courts, the law in over a dozen states, the
Model Penal Code, and the history and tradition of the
First Amendment. Allowed to stand, it will undermine not only the state’s ability to prosecute and incapacitate domestic abusers but also victims’ ability to
obtain justice and protection.
1. By the time respondent Ryan Johnson threatened to kill his mother and burn her house down, the
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police had already been summoned twice in the preceding four days in response to Johnson’s abusive behavior. Pet. App. 70–71. The first contact was a welfare check to investigate allegations that Johnson was
abusing his mother. Pet. App. 70. Johnson’s mother
“reported [to officers] that Johnson had been causing
problems in her home” and that “she was afraid for
her safety.” Pet. App. 70.
A few nights later, Johnson’s mother called 911
when Johnson flew into a violent rage. Johnson’s wife
had sought refuge in a locked room, but Johnson
kicked the door open with such force that he damaged
the frame and broke the metal clasp. Pet. App. 70, 88–
89. Johnson fled before police arrived. Pet. App. 70.
The next morning, Johnson broke into his
mother’s home, ripped her phone off the wall, and told
her to “[t]ry to call the sheriff now, bitch.” Pet. App.
70. Johnson then threatened to kill his mother and
burn her house down. Pet. App. 71.
He was eventually apprehended and charged with
criminally threatening his mother. Pet. App. 71.
As in many cases of domestic violence, Johnson’s
mother and wife “downplayed the two incidents” at
trial, testifying that “the family commonly threatened
to kill each other but did not mean it.” Pet. App. 71.
The jury nevertheless convicted him and he was sentenced to fourteen months’ imprisonment. Pet. App. 73.
2. Respondent Timothy Boettger frequented the
Kwik Shop where Cody Bonham worked. Pet. App.
37. Boettger was well acquainted with Bonham—
Boettger had dated Bonham’s aunt, and had known
Bonham’s father, a detective in the sheriff’s department, since high school. Pet. App. 4.
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One night, Boettger showed up at the Kwik Shop
“unusually intense”—furious that his daughter’s dog
had been shot and left for dead in a ditch, and that the
sheriff’s department had failed to investigate the incident. Pet. App. 4. Fists clenched and visibly shaking,
Boettger approached Bonham and told him: “[I’ve got]
some friends * * * that don’t mess around”—“[You’re]
going to end up finding [your] dad in a ditch”—“You
remember that.” Pet. App. 4.
A jury convicted Boettger of threatening to commit violence with reckless disregard of the risk of
causing fear. Pet. App. 5. He was sentenced to a suspended seven months’ imprisonment.
3. On appeal, both respondents argued that the
First Amendment precludes the state from punishing
violent threats absent proof of specific intent to place
the victim in fear. Pet. App. 5, 73. The Kanas Court
of Appeals affirmed both convictions and respondents
sought review in the Kansas Supreme Court.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed both convictions. Pet. App. 35, 81. In doing so, it exacerbated a
well-developed split by joining the minority of courts
that believe this Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003), compels the conclusion that specific intent is constitutionally required to punish violent threats. Pet. App. 27; see Pet. 11–16.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Violent threats strike immediate fear in the
hearts of their victims. Elonis v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“A threat may cause serious emotional stress for the person threatened and those who
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care about that person, and a threat may lead to a violent confrontation.”). Like “those personally abusive
epithets, which * * * are generally proscribable under
the First Amendment,” such threats “are, as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
[such a] reaction.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), and citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
That effect—immediate, visceral fear and terror—
is precisely what makes violent threats so dangerous
and so effective. Nowhere is that more true than in
the domestic-violence context. “Threats of violence
and intimidation are among the most favored weapons of domestic abusers.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that “the rise of social media has only made
those tactics more commonplace”).
Critically, the effect—and effectiveness—of violent threats does not turn on whether abusers specifically intend to strike fear in the hearts of their victims, or whether they merely consciously disregard
the substantial and unjustifiable risk of doing so. The
damage is done either way. Id. at 2016 (“whether or
not the person making a threat intends to cause harm,
the damage is the same”). In addition to causing serious emotional distress, violent threats also cultivate
and perpetuate an environment of intimidation, isolation, and control that subjects victims to more coercion
and abuse.
Particularly given that this Court “generally ha[s]
not required a heightened mental state under the
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First Amendment for historically unprotected categories of speech,” there is “no reason” why the Court
“should give threats pride of place among unprotected
speech.” Id. at 2027–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
That is especially true given that this Court has never
held that “the First Amendment requires a particular
mental state for threat prosecutions.” Id. at 2026.
This Court’s review is warranted. The split is well
developed and intractable. And the harm to victims is
unconscionable and immeasurable. Violent threats
are integral to physical domestic violence, which
claims twenty victims per minute in this country. Requiring specific intent has no salutary benefits—it
only makes it harder for victims to seek protection and
obtain justice and for the state to prosecute and incapacitate domestic abusers. The petition should be
granted, and the decision below reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

ABSENT THIS COURT’S REVIEW, THE
DECISION BELOW WILL MAKE IT HARDER
FOR DOMESTIC-ABUSE VICTIMS TO SECURE
PROTECTION AND JUSTICE.

Domestic violence is a nationwide scourge that
impacts 10 million people each year. Martin R.
Huecker & William Smock, Domestic Violence (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/nbk499891. That
means “an average of 20 people experience intimate
partner physical violence every minute.” National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, National Statistics:
Domestic Violence Fact Sheet 1, https://assets.speakcdn
.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence2.pdf. And every
day, nearly three women are killed by their current
or former intimate partners. Violence Policy Center,
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When Men Murder Women 3 (2019), http://vpc.org
/studies/wmmw2019.pdf.
“Threats of violence and intimidation are among
the most favored weapons of domestic abusers,” who
use threats to establish dominance and maintain control over their victims by instilling terror, fear, and
uncertainty. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Catherine
F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes &
Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 859 (1993) (“threats
of violence * * * are acts of domestic violence because
they seek to intimidate and control”).
Domestic abusers frequently use violent threats
as part of a “course of calculated, malevolent conduct,”
which involves “interweaving repeated physical abuse
with three equally important tactics: [1] intimidation,
[2] isolation, and [3] control.” Evan Stark, Coercive
Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life 5
(2007); see Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New
Conceptualization, 52 Sex Roles 743, 743 (2005) (abusers assert “power over the[ir] victim[s] through the
use of threats, as well as actual violence”).
First, violent threats create and maintain a climate of fear and doubt for the victim. Unlike physical
abuse, which has temporal and geographic bounds, violent threats are “unpredictable yet omnipresent,”
creating unbounded fear and uncertainty that leads to
“hyper-vigilant behavior and symptoms of hyperarousal as a function of the unpredictable nature of
the traumatic stressor.” Mindy B. Mechanic et al.,
Mental Health Consequences of Intimate Partner
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Abuse: A Multidimensional Assessment of Four Different Forms of Abuse, 17 Violence Against Women 634,
644 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/pmc2967430/pdf/nihms245802.pdf.
Indeed, a “large body of research” has found the
extreme psychological and physiological stress created by a climate of menace and persistent threats
may actually be more damaging than the physical violence being threatened. Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex
Roles at 753; see Mechanic et al., 17 Violence Against
Women at 635.
Second, violent threats prevent victims from seeking help. Violent threats create and reinforce a fear of
escalation that is well founded, as research indicates
what common sense suggests: violent threats lead to
physical violence in over half of domestic-abuse incidents. Mary P. Brewster, Stalking by Former Intimates: Verbal Threats and Other Predictors of Physical Violence, 15 Violence & Victims 41, 41–54 (2000)
(“Threats of violence were significantly correlated
with actual physical violence in every model.”).
Third, violent threats coerce compliance and exert
control by “deflat[ing] the victim’s will to resist.” Evan
Stark, Coercive Control, in Violence Against Women:
Current Theory & Practice in Domestic Abuse, Sexual
Violence, and Exploitation 17, 23 (2013). “Coercive
control * * * is a dynamic process linking a demand
with a credible threatened negative consequence for
noncompliance.” Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex Roles at
746–47; see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
how abusers control their victims by creating “serious
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emotional stress for the person threatened and those
who care about that person”).
Given “a sufficiently serious threat, coercion can
occur in a relationship even when there has been no
prior violence or threat to ‘soften’ the [victim’s] resistance.” Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex Roles at 747.
“Exposure to coercive acts means exposure to threats
of harm, including those that would be considered
traumatic stressors such as threats of harm to self or
others.” Id. at 752. Many violent threats “meet the
event criterion for posttraumatic stress disorder.”
Ibid. So it should come as no surprise that “the consequences of coercive control include the range” of
mental and physical health problems “associated with
traumatic exposure”—including depression, anxiety,
gastrointestinal problems, sleep problems, and hypertension. Id. at 753; see Mechanic et al., 17 Violence
Against Women at 642.
For example, studies show that as many as 84 percent of domestic-violence victims suffer from PTSD—
compared to about 10 percent of the general population and 26 percent of crime victims. Dutton & Goodman, 52 Sex Roles at 753 (noting the prevalence of depression ranges from 15–70 percent among domesticviolence victims, compared to 10–20 percent among
the general population).
In addition to “the adverse mental health outcomes” faced by domestic-violence victims, there is
also “a significant relationship between [domestic
abuse] and poor [physical] health outcomes, including
self-reported heath status, somatic symptoms, risk of
illness, and exacerbated medical conditions.” Ibid.
Studies have shown that “[p]sychological violence was
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associated with self-reported poor physical health as
well as other specific medical problems, including
chronic neck or back pain, arthritis, migraines or
other frequent headaches, and stomach ulcer.” Ibid.;
see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“A threat may cause serious emotional stress for the person threatened and
those who care about that person, and a threat may
lead to a violent confrontation.”).
In sum, violent threats—particularly in the domestic-abuse context—inflict great harm. By making
it harder to prosecute such threats, the Kansas Supreme Court has made it easier for domestic abusers
to inflict abuse on their victims. This Court’s review
is needed to eliminate this unnecessary barrier to protecting victims and securing justice.
II. THE DECISION BELOW MISCONSTRUES THIS
COURT’S PRECEDENT, JOINS THE WRONG
SIDE OF A WELL-DEVELOPED SPLIT, AND
NEEDLESSLY HAMPERS VICTIMS’ ACCESS TO
JUSTICE.
Violent threats “inflict great harm and have little
if any social value”—they “cause serious emotional
stress for the person threatened and those who care
about that person.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“a
threat may lead to a violent confrontation”). The court
below erroneously believed this Court’s precedent
compelled the result it reached—but this Court has
never held that the First Amendment requires any
particular mental state (specific intent or otherwise)
to punish violent threats. And for good reason.
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There is nothing in the First Amendment’s history
or tradition that would compel imposing a specific-intent requirement. “ ‘From 1791 to the present, our society has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas,’ true threats being one
of them.” Id. at 2024 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ellipses
omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382–83 (1992)).
Violent threats, like fighting words, inflict injury
“by their very utterance” and are “of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 572. Such threats “are generally proscribable under the First Amendment” precisely because they
“are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently
likely to provoke [harmful psychological and physiological] reaction.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359.1
And the impact on—and harm to—victims is the
same “whether or not the person making a threat intends to cause harm.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the fact
that making a threat may have a therapeutic or cathartic effect for the speaker is not sufficient to justify
constitutional protection”). Focusing on a violent
threat’s impact, rather than on the speaker’s subjective intent, better comports with this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, imposing an “intent-to-threaten requirement * * * would make threats
one of the most protected categories of unprotected
1

As the Black Court explained, the government has a compelling interest in not only preventing violence, but also protecting
its citizens from the fear, terror, and disruption caused by threats.
538 U.S. at 360 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).
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speech,” which in turn would “sow[ ] tension throughout [the Court’s] First Amendment doctrine.” Id. at
2027 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
For example, fighting words can be punished
“without proof of an intent to provoke a violent reaction”; obscenity can be punished “without proof that
[the perpetrator] knew the materials were legally obscene”; and defamation can be punished “even if the
speaker acted negligently with respect to the falsity of
[his] statements.” Ibid. (citing cases); see id. at 2017
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“proof that false statements were made with reckless
disregard of their falsity” is sufficient to establish both
civil and criminal liability) (citing cases).
Imposing a specific-intent requirement is not only
unnecessary, but also harmful—unduly burdening
victims and impeding the punishment and incapacitation of abusers. “Requiring evidence of specific intent”
in violent-threat prosecutions would “prove to be very
difficult and time-consuming” without generating any
coordinate benefits. United States v. Bradbury, 111
F. Supp. 3d 918, 923 (N.D. Ind. 2015); see Jerman v.
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559
U.S. 573, 596 n.14 (2010) (“specific intent * * * is difficult to prove”).
Specific intent “is always determined by objective
means”—what others heard and can testify about.
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004). In the
domestic-violence context, the victim—the person best
positioned to testify about the content and context of
the threat—is often (and understandably) unwilling
or unable to do so. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call
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to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 959, 994, 1022 (2004).
It is well established that “[v]ictims of domestic
violence are more prone than other crime victims to
recant or refuse to cooperate after initially providing
information to police.” Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 768 (2005);
see People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004)
(quoting expert’s testimony that “80 to 85 percent of
victims ‘actually recant at some point in the process’ ”). That should come as no surprise, given not
only the history of intimidation, isolation, and coercive
control frequently experienced by victims, but also the
very real risk of future physical and psychological retribution. This dynamic understandably deters victims
of domestic violence from invoking the legal process in
the first place—to say nothing of having to confront the
abuser in open court. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Re-Representing Woman Battering: From Battered Woman’s
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 973,
1010–11 (1995). As one researcher explained:
Some women may correctly fear retaliation
by the abuser, based on their knowledge of
the abuser’s personality and psychology.
Others who are suffering from PTSD may
avoid talking to their legal representatives,
miss appointments, or avoid going to court
because they cannot bear to re-invoke the
traumatic experiences by talking and thinking about them.
Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 Hofstra L.
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Rev. 1295, 1345 (1993) (victims’ “[a]mbivalence about
pursuing legal action” stems from “very realistic concerns”); see also Stark, 58 Alb. L. Rev. at 1025 (describing the “mix of social and psychological factors
that makes it seemingly impossible for the [domesticviolence] victim to permanently escape or to effectively protect herself”).
Requiring the state to prove specific intent in domestic-violence cases would needlessly exacerbate an
already life-threatening problem and make it even
harder for victims of domestic violence to access justice—and safety.2
The Kansas statute declared unconstitutional by
the court below—like the Model Penal Code and the
statutes in a number of other states (Pet. 23 n.3)—
strikes a reasonable balance in protecting abuse victims and free speech by requiring proof of recklessness as to the effect of the threat on the victim. Kan.
Stat. § 21-5415(a)(1) (requiring a threat of violence
made in reckless disregard for causing fear); Model
Penal Code § 211.3 (“A person is guilty of a felony of the
third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of
violence with purpose to terrorize another * * * or in
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”).
2

The collateral consequences of constitutionalizing a specificintent requirement bring the stakes of this case into even
sharper relief. As one commentator has explained, because at
least eighteen states link the availability of civil protection orders to proof that a criminal threat was made, requiring evidence
that the abuser acted with specific intent will make it “even more
difficult for victims of domestic violence” to obtain such orders—
which are one of the most critical legal tools available to victims.
Maria A. Brusco, Note, Read This Note or Else!: Conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for Recklessly Making a Threat, 84 Fordham L.
Rev. 2845, 2874–75 (2016).
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Requiring recklessness ameliorates any concern
that not requiring proof of specific intent “will chill
statements that do not qualify as true threats, e.g.,
statements that may be literally threatening but are
plainly not meant to be taken seriously.” Elonis, 135
S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have also held that the law provides
adequate breathing space when it requires proof that
false statements were made with reckless disregard of
their falsity. Requiring proof of recklessness is similarly sufficient here.”) (internal citations omitted).
The Kansas statute here (like those in many other
states) also appropriately reflects the reality that domestic abusers regularly follow through on their
threats. See Brewster, 15 Violence & Victims at 41–
54 (“Threats of violence [are] significantly correlated
with actual physical violence in every model”—leading to significant physical violence in well over half of
the cases).
The facts of Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.
Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), prove the point. Tracey
Thurman’s estranged husband, Charles, spent the
better part of a year threatening to murder her and
their infant son, C.J. Id. at 1524–25. Tracey’s complaints to the police were “ignored or rejected.” Ibid.
Things escalated when Charles attacked Tracey and
kidnapped their son. Ibid. After Charles returned—
smashing Tracey’s windshield and screaming threats
at her while she was sitting in her car—he was arrested and received a six-month suspended sentence.
Ibid. For the next five months, he repeatedly threatened to kill Tracey. Ibid. She got a restraining order
against him, but it did nothing to stop the barrage of
threats. Ibid.
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A month later, Charles stabbed Tracey 13 times
in her chest, neck, and throat outside her home. Ibid.
When the police arrived, they watched as Charles
dropped the bloody knife, kicked Tracey in the head,
and ran inside her home. Id. at 1526. He came back
with their son C.J. and dropped the child on Tracey’s
wounded body before kicking her in the head a second
time. Ibid. Tracey survived the attack but was left
partially paralyzed.
Throughout her ordeal, Tracey sought the protection of the criminal-justice system, reporting the
threats to police and obtaining a restraining order and
even an arrest—to no avail. Restraining orders and
arrests are important first steps, see James Ptacek,
Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial Responses 164–65 (1999), but incapacitation
and incarceration are critical to domestic-violence victims’ safety and well-being. The First Amendment
does not require the criminal-justice system to wait
until domestic abusers finally make good on their violent threats before taking action to protect and vindicate victims.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant
the petition for certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.
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